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this second stage the prominent philosophers of the time (exemplified in this volume 
by Alexander of Aphrodisias, later Stoics such as Seneca, and later Platonist thinkers, 
including Plotinus) became aware that they needed to position their own views in 
relation to Aristotle’s account of causation.
Aristotle’s account, with its ambition to be an exhaustive causal analysis of reality, 
motivated the philosophers of the Imperial period to produce either alternative but 
equally comprehensive systems, or complementary ones to it. Thinkers of this time thus 
engage in re-interpreting, each in their own terms, alternative systems of causes that 
their contemporaries or even predecessors had developed. Their overall goal is to look 
for a theoretical reconciliation, as it were, and a single comprehensive theory that could 
incorporate systems of causes that were originally different and remained difficult to 
fit together. But the exercise was fruitful, in that it gave raise to much philosophical 
thinking that is still for us to fully explore. And this is one of the points that I take the 
editors want to make : looking at this period in the history of philosophy is exciting and 
this stimulating book is intended to open up many further avenues for research that will 
take forward the work done so far.
Anna Marmodoro
Corpus Christi College, Oxford 
Mauro Bonazzi, À la recherche des idées  : platonisme et philosophie hellénistique 
d’Antiochus à Plotin, Vrin, Paris, 2015, 176 p. (Histoire des doctrines de l’Antiquité 
classique, 46) ISBN : 978-2-7116-2578-9.
Mauro Bonazzi is well known among scholars of ancient philosophy for his many 
valuable contributions in the area of late ancient philosophy. His papers on Antiochus, 
Eudorus, Plutarch, and the Anonymous commentator of the Theaetetus are interesting, 
learned and thought provoking. In his new book he sets out to ofer a synthetic overview 
of the history of Platonism from Antiochus to Plotinus. his is an extremely rich period 
of the history of Platonism. To begin with, we encounter as diverse philosophical proiles 
of Platonists as those of Antiochus, Plutarch, Numenius, the Anonymous in Theaetetum, 
and Plotinus. Antiochus rejects the sceptical academic tradition and sets out to revive 
the ancient Academy, Plutarch and the Anonymous in Theaetetum try to combine both 
strands of earlier Platonism, Numenius is inspired by the Pythagorean tradition, while 
Plotinus accommodates all these aspects in his work. As a result, Platonists take diferent 
stances on theory of knowledge, metaphysics, and ethics. It is not, however, only the case 
that Platonists disagree with each other as to how to interpret Plato’s philosophy as a whole 
and how to reconstruct speciic areas of Plato’s philosophy, such as epistemology and 
ethics. Contemporary Peripatetics also disagreed about the interpretation of Aristotle. 
he disagreement of Platonists though is the result of the diferent emphasis they put on 
parts of Plato’s work and also the result of the impact of hellenistic philosophy, especially 
of Stoicism and scepticism, on their thought. As the title of the book shows, Bonazzi is 
interested in approaching  late Platonist philosophy from this speciic point of view. 
his approach is well justiied. For Antiochus’ thought is greatly shaped by Stoicism 
while he tries to distance himself from academic scepticism, Plutarch sets himself in 
dialogue with both Stoics and Epicureans while he is inspired by academic scepticism, 
Numenius and Atticus plead for a puriied Platonism but their thought is also inluenced 
by hellenistic philosophies, especially Stoicism, and, inally, Plotinus is in constant 
dialogue with Stoic philosophy and wary of scepticism. 
Bonazzi’s book is divided in three main chapters. he irst centers on Antiochus (‘‘Les 
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Débuts: Antiochus d’Ascalon et l’appropriation du Stoïcisme”, p.  15-68). he second 
chapter focuses mainly on Plutarch but it also considers the Anonymous commentator 
of the heaetetus and Alcinous (‘‘Plutarque, Alcinoos et le problème de la transcendance”, 
p.  69-107). Finally, the third chapter is dedicated mainly to Plotinus (‘‘Un regard 
rétrospectif : Plotin, les platoniciens et le scepticisme”, p. 117-151). he book is rounded 
by an extensive bibliography and an index locorum. 
he chapter on Antiochus focuses particularly on his epistemology, which, as 
is well known, is considerably inluenced by Stoicism, namely the Stoic doctrine of 
concepts and cognitive impressions. here is some strong evidence to that efect in 
Cicero’s Academica I (Varro, esp. 30-32). Cicero actually accuses Antiochus of becoming 
Stoic (germanissimus Stoicus, Acad. II.132), and in a sense he is right, since Antiochus 
adopts a part of the Stoic theory that does not exist in Plato (Acad. II.112-113), the 
theory of cognitive impressions. he question, however, is how Antiochus justiied his 
epistemological position. he evidence from Cicero suggests that Antiochus argued 
that one of the criteria for knowledge according to the Stoics, the concepts or ennoiai, 
capture the Platonic Forms as they appear in the Meno, for instance, where the Forms 
have a clear epistemological role. Antiochus presumably defended a version of innatism, 
according to which humans have innate concepts or ideas, as suggested in the Meno, by 
means of which we perceive something as X (e.g. horse or table). Bonazzi elaborates well 
on that point. He discusses in some detail the relevant evidence from Cicero to the efect 
that Antiochus identiied the Stoic concepts with Plato’s Forms (p.  32-42). Bonazzi 
concludes that this cannot be seen as a genuine position of Plato; Antiochus, he claims, 
rather appropriates the Stoic theory and systematizes Plato’s epistemology in a certain 
way, a strategy that has as a consequence a certain split between Plato and Platonism 
(p. 50). his is certainly a reasonable, fair judgment. Ancient Platonists, however, are not 
like modern scholars of Plato, who set out to study Plato’s thought and oten conclude 
that certain arguments in Plato do not work. Ancient Platonists set out to interpret 
Plato in such a way that his philosophy emerges as the best conceivable option on a given 
question. his is the task that all Platonists in antiquity undertake. How representative 
of Plato is, for instance, Xenocrates’ view that the soul is a self moving number or that the 
cosmogony of the Timaeus should be understood in a metaphorical sense? Antiochus’ 
strategy is diferent from the traditional Platonist attitude only to the extent that his 
materials for the reconstruction of Plato come at least partly from Stoicism. his is 
indeed new, but the method of proposing a personal reconstruction of Plato is not. 
Chapter two takes us to Plutarch, the Anonymous in Theaetetum and Alcinous. 
Bonazzi examines irst Plutarch’s position towards the sceptical Academy and pyrrhonism. 
And he draws our attention to some texts of Plutarch that connect Epicurus and Pyrrho 
(e.g. Quaest. Conv. 651e-652a). Plutarch apparently maintained that materialism leads 
to scepticism. But the question is how. Plutarch seems to have suggested that if sense 
perception is the result of a contact with an object understood as consisting of a cluster 
of material qualities, then all sense perception is necessarily fallible, because diferent 
qualities of the object may afect diferent people diferently. Bonazzi shows well that for 
Plutarch the scepticism of the Academy is a position considerably diferent from Pyrrho’s 
radical scepticism, since the latter is a consequence of an empiricist epistemology while 
the former is the result of a, so to speak, metaphysical epistemology; for sceptical 
Academics, according to Plutarch, mistrust sensations and the sensible world as a 
whole, while they trust only the intelligible world and its impact on us. I ind Plutarch’s 
argument interesting but not convincing; both Academics and Pyrrhonists doubt the 
ability of our senses to convey the external reality faithfully to us. If Academics are 
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dualists, as Plutarch implies, they need to explain why we fail to know the intelligible 
reality, the Forms, that account for the identity of sensible things, especially since, as the 
Theaetetus suggests (185cd), it is the soul that perceives through the senses. Plutarch 
himself maintains a form of scepticism that Bonazzi terms “metaphysical scepticism”. 
According to this version of scepticism, it is the overall human cognitive ability that is 
doubted given our, human, limitations (p. 101). his sense of scepticism may be found 
also in Alcinous, claims Bonazzi, for our ability to know is said again to be constrained 
by our coninement in body (Didaskalikos 155.20-36; p. 109). he reference to notions, 
ennoiai, that we ind in both Plutarch and Alcinous, is not suicient for winning against 
the challenge of scepticism. It is Plotinus who will ight scepticism by defending the 
possibility of man to liberate his intellect from bodily constraints. he last chapter of the 
book that is devoted to Plotinus focuses on this line of thought.
Bonazzi examines some important passages of Plotinus (esp. from Ennead V.5) that 
show clearly that for Plotinus the perception of a sensible object is an image (eidolon) and 
as such is fallible. he fallibility of sense perception is a consequence of the metaphysical 
status of the perceived object. his, however, does not mean that we are not in a position 
to acquire true knowledge. his can be attained by the intellect, or the non descended 
soul, which is capable of recognizing the intellectual reality, that is, what truly is. 
Bonazzi is right to claim that Plotinus is not confronting scepticism directly (p.  144) 
and he is also right to stress the similiarities between Plotinus’ view about the identity of 
the intellect and the intelligibles and the Peripatetic theory of intellect as we ind it in 
Alexander of Aphrodisias (p. 146-148). But this does not justify the claim, at least not 
fully, that Plotinus seeks to redeine Platonism through a critical dialogue with Aristotle 
(p. 148). For as Bonazzi himself acknowledges (p. 148, n. 4), this dialogue with Aristotle 
permeates Platonism since Antiochus, if not earlier. 
Bonazzi shows well, however, that late ancient Platonists are continuously engaged 
with scepticism; they try diferent tools in dealing with the sceptical challenge, such as 
the elements of Stoic epistemology, Plato’s Forms, or the Peripatetic theory of intellect. 
Bonazzi’s book is a very welcome addition to the literature about late ancient Platonists 
and indeed one that stresses the important role of the Platonist epistemological concerns 
in how their overall interpretation of Plato was shaped. It deserves to be studied by all 
scholars of late ancient philosophy.
George Karamanolis
University of Vienna
Carlos Lévy  et Lucia Saudelli (éd.), Présocratiques latins : Héraclite, traductions, 
introductions et commentaires, Paris, Les Belles Lettres, 2014 (coll. Fragments, 17), 
LXXII-200 p., ISBN : 978-2-251-74215-1. 
Ce livre, issu du programme « Présocratiques Grecs/Présocratiques Latins » financé 
par l’Agence Nationale de la Recherche (ANR) et dirigé par André Laks et Carlos Lévy, 
est le fruit d’une tentative fort intéressante de mettre l’accent sur la question de la 
spécificité de la transmission et de l’utilisation latine des présocratiques. Car sans nul 
doute, dans le domaine des études présocratiques, les témoignages issus de la tradition 
latine ne se trouvent pas au même niveau que ceux provenant de la tradition grecque, le 
préjugé commun étant que la tradition latine ne représente qu’une information grecque 
traduite, plus ou moins maladroitement, en latin.  lxxii
Les auteurs ont entièrement raison de souligner que cette approche se révèle trop 
réductrice, et tentent de réparer cette injustice en commençant par Héraclite ; ils nous 
